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Toward a Poeticognosis: Re-reading Plato's The
Republic via Wallace Stevens' "An Ordinary Evening in
New Haven"
  Dan Disney
Abstract
This article is a language-based re-reading of Plato's exile of
the poets via Wallace Stevens' poem-manifesto, "An Ordinary
Evening in New Haven." I examine how philosophy and poetry
use language differently in order to deconstruct an origin of
the speech-acts -- wonder -- that I then identify as a
phenomenological difference between philosophers and poets.
I contend that the thinking-into-language of philosophers is
based in theoria, comprehension, and a resulting closure of
wonder. I contrast this with the processes of poets, who I
show to be moving thought into language via gnosis,
apprehension, and a phenomenology opening onto
inexhaustible wonder.
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The search/ For reality is as momentous as/ The search for
god. It is the philosopher's search// For an interior made
exterior/ And the poet's search for the same exterior made/
Interior ...
Wallace Stevens "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"[1]
... we shall treat him with all the reverence due to a priest and
giver of rare pleasure, but shall tell him that he and his kind
have no place in our city, their presence being forbidden by
our code, and send him elsewhere, after anointing him with
myrrh and crowning him with fillets of wool.
Plato, The Republic (Book Three)[2]

1. What Is Poetry to Philosophy?
Platonic philosophy, re-read here as composed of performative
rather than constative utterances,[3] is a stance for
rationalism and censorship in opposition to ancient poetry's
mnemonics, stirring of emotions, divine inspiration, and, as
Plato took it at least, misrepresented truths via imperfect
copies (poems) of universal forms. Plato forsook the rarer
pleasures of poetry to establish stability and cohesion via the
rhetoric of philosophical thinking. Arthur Danto writes of
Plato's theories in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art
(1986) as being "largely political, a move in some struggle for
domination over the minds of men in which art is conceived of
as the enemy."[4] Commentator Mark Edmundson goes
further in Literature Against Philosophy, Plato to Derrida: a
Defence of Poetry (1995), stating "(l)iterary criticism began in
the West with the wish that literature disappear," then
wonders if there is "any other kind of intellectual inquiry that
originates in a wish to do away with its object?"[5]

So what is poetry to philosophy? To Plato, poetry represents a
threat to the cohesion of his ideal city-state through
languaging an otherliness which he labels
misrepresentative,[6] untruthful,[7] and an agent of
corruption.[8] What precisely is Plato scared of? In seeking to
configure a set of steadfast rules in The Republic, Plato
projects poetry as dangerous, flawed, and unstable because he
perceives the minds of the ancient Greeks as if blank, able to
be projected onto by the language of his ideas. This clashing of
truth-effects between two genres formalizes the ancient
quarrel between philosophy and poetry. Plato fears that poets,
erring into strangeness and individualistic expressivity, will
transgress the boundaries of his genre rules -- and these are
rules that he will use as a cornerstone on which to found
civilizations.
What I contend is that each time poets fix their gaze,
awestruck and bound by a state of wonder as if seeing things
anew, language shifts into new areas of expressivity, the very
thing Plato is fearful of. Wallace Stevens writes of the impulse
toward poetic newness in "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven"
(first published in The Auroras of Autumn, 1950), §XII:
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it.
The poet speaks the poem as it is,
Not as it was: part of the reverberation
Of a windy night as it is, when the marble statues
Are like newspapers blown by the wind. He
speaks
By sight and insight as they are.[9]
Poems aim toward a leading edge of language. This is
language-being, the poem speaking of the thing as it is,
moving toward newness via observation (apprehension) and a
style of thinking-into-language (comprehension),[10] that is
the Stevensonian sight and insight. Viewing the world, a poem
utters "the cry of its occasion" as if it were a container for a
form of timeless beauty. A poem is a disclosure, rather than
philosophical closure, of the I-am-ness of poets' wonder
moving pliantly into language. This language-being shocks
readers (can "take the top of a head off" says Emily Dickinson)
with its strange beauty, and its metaphorico-metonymical
slippages into newness.
This is the sort of transmission of individualistic expressivity
that Plato seeks to control with his performative truth-effects.
In defaming and exiling poetry, Plato seeks to create an
exclusive space in the dialectic for his own version of
truthfulness. In so doing, to follow commentator Louis Mackey,
philosophy finds its origin: "(i)t originates as the dialectical
critique of poetry."[11] Plato establishes philosophy's
organizing principles (and the future trajectories of his
discourse) via his ideal of the universal forms. These provide a
transcendental limit to the structures of philosophy: ontology,
epistemology, ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics are to be
controlled by a genre that rhetorizes its claims to meaning and

truthfulness. This seems to be an early manifestation of
performativity, which might equally be labelled a form of
"language-doing."
For Plato's language is certainly doing something. He goes on
to deploy his notion of the forms, and therewith subjugate the
claims to validity of poetry, in Book Seven of The Republic.
During Plato's allegory of the cave, the universal forms appear
as an abstract realm of objects existing in perfection
somewhere beyond the sensate, physical world. Conducting
his elenchus, that philosophical technique of "emptying out" a
question (which is perhaps an ancient precursor to the
processes of postructuralist deconstruction), Plato is quite the
dramaturge: The Republic is written as a dialogue between
Socrates and Plato's older brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon.
Discussing the forms, Socrates tells Glaucon:
(t)he realm revealed by sight corresponds to the
prison, and the light of the fire in the prison to
the power of the sun. And you won't go wrong if
you connect the ascent into the upper world and
the sight of the objects there with the upward
progress of the mind into the intelligible region.
That at any rate is my interpretation, which is
what you are anxious to hear; the truth of the
matter is, after all, known only to god. But in my
opinion, for what it is worth, the final thing to be
perceived in the intelligible region, and perceived
only with difficulty, is the form of the good; once
seen, it is inferred to be responsible for whatever
is right and valuable in anything, producing in the
visible region light and the source of light, and
being in the intelligible region itself controlling
source of truth and intelligence.[12]
This, the site of the forms, is beyond the spatio-temporal
humanly real; it is here that Platonic reality exists in a pure
state, transcendentally,alongside truth and knowledge. Or so
Plato speculates, inventing his ideas. The philosopher knows
The Republic may either persuade or be challenged by his
audience; a higher authority, however, will not judge his
thoughts constative (true or false). They are instead rhetorical.
To adopt the parlance of poststructuralists, Plato's philosophy
contains echoes of a metaphysics of presence, but underneath
the language of Plato's transcendental signifiers -- god, the
universal forms -- there is not the essentialized truth he
claims. There is only more language. The translations differ
slightly here, in that instead of Lee's translation (1974) "the
truth of the matter is, after all, known only to god," in Sterling
and Scott's translation (1985) Socrates states "(g)od only
knows whether it is true."[13] This is a reflexive flourish;
Socrates is translated here as appealing to a voiceless divine
power that, Plato can safely assume, will not speak. Glaucon, a
nodding figure throughout The Republic,[14] will have to listen
to Socrates' narrations because no higher authority is able to
enter this discourse -- a discourse that is actually, as we see,
a narrated monologue of Plato's thinking, carried out between
a range of characters and poetico-literary devices.
And so the forms, existing preternaturally in a perfect and
unchanging, infinite state, are used against poets by Plato to

rid his city-state of their (potentially) volatile speech-acts.
Each object in the world, Plato states, is an imitation of a
transcendently-located form. Plato believes that in order to
imitate things in the world, poets must first achieve mastery
over these, and that such broad-ranging specialization, in an
era of guilds and technical expertise, is impossible. He writes
in Book Ten of The Republic that "the artist's representation
stands at a third remove from reality",[15] and at the very
moment of exile, in Book Three, that
if we are visited in our state by someone who has
the skill to transform himself into all sorts of
characters and represent all sorts of things, and
he wants to show off himself and his poems to
us, we shall treat him with all the reverence due
to a priest and giver of rare pleasure, but shall
tell him that he and his kind have no place in our
city...[16]
To follow the path of Plato's rhetoric, then, is to accept that
the inventions of poets cannot be trusted, that poems are
copies of the world's essentialized copies of ontologicallyexisting forms. Plato, at the insistence of his transcendentalism
and with his philosophy working within a framework of final
purposes, regards poetry as existing at three removes from
perfection. Plato tags poets "imitators of imitations," thrice
removed from the arché (origin) of the forms. For Plato, it is
philosophy that will build a royal road, via synthesizing
rhetorical maneuvers, leading to the purest origins of
truthfulness and knowledge. Poetry, says Plato, is instead a
movement away from perfection.
2. The Language-Masked Reality of Philosophy
This confabulation of philosophical meaning is to dialectically
outmaneuver the claims poetry makes for its own trutheffects.[17] Returning to Stevens, we see, in §XXII of his
poem the difference between speech-acts framed as follows:
Professor Eucalyptus said "The search
For reality is as momentous as
The search for god." It is the philosopher's search
For an interior made exterior
And the poet's search for the same exterior made
Interior: breathless things broodingly abreath
With the inhalations of original cold
And of original earliness.[18]
Stevens has intuited a genre divide between the speech-acts,
perhaps better put as two opposing approaches toward the
same subject, reality, that I frame as split between the
humanly real (logos, lexis) and the world, existing
preternaturally. This is a divide or difference of approach that
seems irreconcilable, unbridgeable. Stevens seems to be
suggesting philosophers mask the world with rhetorical
language in their search for, and critically discursive
construction of, the humanly real. In other words, the thinking

of philosophers -- the projection of their interiority -- makes a
language-masked human reality. And so when we read of
Plato, who is responding to an "ancient antagonism"[19]
between the speech-acts, performatively exiling the poets, we
might wonder what his philosophy is seeking to achieve. Does
Plato exteriorize his interior thoughts? His language masks the
humanly real with a hierarchy of reified ideas. Herewith, the
humanly real will not be built by poets but by philosophers
performatively placing themselves in dialectical control of
language.
And yet, Plato's language in The Republic slips across the
genres and into a mode resembling the poetic. In Book Seven,
for example, Plato writes his allegory[20] of the cave so as to
elucidate philosophy's role in decoding ontology. In speaking
as the other (that is, allegorically) Plato chooses to use
language that is figurative, metaphorical. What follows are a
series of images Plato asks his audience to consider part of his
philosophical edifice:
SOCRATES: I want you to picture the
enlightenment or ignorance of our human
condition somewhat as follows. Imagine an
underground chamber like a cave, with a long
entrance open to the daylight and as wide as the
cave. In this chamber are men who have been
prisoners there since they were children, their
legs and necks being so fastened that they can
only look straight ahead of them and cannot turn
their heads. Some way off, behind and higher up,
a fire is burning, and between the fire and the
prisoners and above them runs a road, in front of
which a curtain-wall has been built, like the
screen at puppet shows between the operators
and their audience, above which they show their
puppets.
GLAUCON: I see.[21]
Plato's allegory resonates with artifice. Indeed, it is as if
Glaucon, and by osmosis Plato's general audience, has been
invited to a puppet show Plato is conducting. This is a
figurative representation that uses language that performs
strictly for the edification of Plato's captive audience, who
might be likened to the prisoners in his cave. His is a
dramatic, imitative speculation that moves away from the
philosophical mode of elenchus to build a linguistic "speaking
picture," that the Roman theorist Horace would later discuss in
framing poetic modes. Plato's philosophy is transferring
ontological truth-effects via the curtain-walls of his text here.
And Glaucon's response? "I see" can be taken literally;
Glaucon has had the puppet-strings of his imagination pulled.
"I see" is a response to Plato's mimesis. An image has been
transmitted as soon as Glaucon declares that he sees,
springing from the mind of Plato via the invented mouth of his
narrator, Socrates, into the phenomenology of readers via an
allegory that is figurative, metaphorical, and deeply poetic.
Simply put, Plato maneuvers an idea into the minds of his
readers by deploying a range of poetico-literary devices he
exiles poets for using.
So, via Plato's pseudo-poetic allegory of the cave, the speech-

acts (poetry, philosophy) and their different functions can be
re-situated. If we agree with Plato that reality can be likened
to a chorus of puppets on a stage, be held inexorably by
inmates locked in darkness, then into this simulacrum thought
arrives, masked by language to parade its human meanings in
a variety of manners. Inside his cave allegory, what role does
Plato suggest philosophers play? He writes of a fire burning,
behind which are gathered prisoners who have never seen
daylight and who mistake as real the shadows cast upon a wall
by people "carrying all sorts of gear along behind the curtainwall, projecting above it and including figures of men and
animals made of wood and stone and all sorts of other
materials."[22] Further, some of these people talk among
themselves, creating the illusion that sound is coming from the
passing shadows. This illusion is misapprehended by the cave's
prisoners, who mistake the shadows of the objects mentioned
as "the whole truth."[23] Some, momentarily freed from the
cave, go to the world of pure reality above -- the site of the
universal forms --o and bear witness before returning to
regale their fellow prisoners with visions of "the brightest of all
realities" outside.[24] Plato assigns this role to philosophers,
for philosophers tell a form of truthfulness, Plato avows, not
because they are inspired or possessed (as he states poets
are, in Ion[25]) but because of what they have, to speak
metaphorically, seen. But Plato's thinking is self-contradictory;
ever the pedagogue, the philosopher's speculative knowledge
is fixed by a transcendental signifier, self-imposed, that he
wants audiences to leave unquestioned. In appealing to an
unspeaking higher authority, the truth-effects contained in
Plato's speculations are undermined.
So what do poets do differently when their thinking enters into
language? Plato's construct of the forms can be evaded or
recuperated via Stevens' concluding figure in "An Ordinary
Evening in New Haven," §XXXI. The poet writes
It is not in the premise that reality
Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses
A dust, a force that traverses a shade.[26]
Poetries echo in linguistic slippages and absences -- shades
over dust, forces over shades -- that effectively problematize
the solidity of philosophy's rhetorical and performative framing
of its truth-effects. Plato's allegory of the cave, recuperated
here, becomes illustrative. Suppose Plato's cave is occupied by
philosophers who stand at the fire, deep in the elenchus of
philosophical reasoning, responding to the shadows and
curtain-wall representations with answers that explicate (and
in so doing, nullify) wonder, terminating questions with
ontological speculation in the guise of solid truth. Occasionally
one of their number prophetically professes to have glimpsed
a greater reality. But suppose the darker reaches of the cave
are peopled by prisoners who have found no succor in
philosophy's answering styles. Suppose these individuals shout
in arcane languages that shock and delight as they dance like
the flames in the distance. Beyond the fireside nodding of the
philosophical cohort, these individuals can be heard to utter
and moan, their echoes resounding. Suppose this uncanny
resonance causes the philosophers by their fire to huddle
closer in their discourses, while around them the questioning

noise of wonder issuing from the spectral presences that haunt
at the enclosed boundaries of fireside talk. These are the
poets, moving deeper into Plato's cave, mapless and alone.
They have escaped the impulse to move toward a brighter
reality, crying out instead from a solitude of sublimely
imagined darkness.
Is this what separates the genres? Both respond to wonder,
but differently. According to both Plato and Aristotle,
philosophy -- etymologically, a conjugation of "to love" and
"wisdom" -- originates in wonder (from the Greek
"thaumazein"). In Theaetetus Plato writes that "this feeling -a sense of wonder -- is perfectly proper to a philosopher:
philosophy has no other foundation, in fact."[27] . Aristotle, in
Metaphysics (3rd century B.C.E.) goes even further,
suggesting
[I]t is because of wondering that men began to
philosophise and do so now. First, they wondered
at the difficulties close at hand; then, advancing
little by little, they discussed difficulties also
about greater matters, for example, about the
changing attributes of the Moon and of the Sun
and of the stars, and about the generation of the
universe.[28]
Moving from the difficulties close at hand outward, human
wondering can be characterized as a mutating impulse that
seeks to know of things that are apprehended from the
particular to the abstract to the sublime and mysterious.
Plato's philosophical text exhausts apprehended wonder with
reasoning's comprehending response. A poem like Wallace
Stevens', by contrast, contains the immanence of the darkness
of unknowing, situated as a series of responding questions. A
poem serves here as a linguistic extension of the process of
wonder.
In introducing her book, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek
Philosophy (2004), classicist Andrea Wilson Nightingale states
philosophy "originates in wonder and aporia and aims for
certainty and knowledge."[29] She goes on to define
"theoria"[30] as the philosophical response to wonder. Thus
[I]n the effort to conceptualise and legitimise
theoretical philosophy, the fourth-century
thinkers invoked a specific institution: that which
the ancients called "theoria." In the traditional
practice of theoria, an individual (called the
theoros) made a journey or pilgrimage abroad for
the purpose of witnessing certain events and
spectacles. In the classical period, theoria took
the form of pilgrimages to oracles and religious
festivals. In many cases, the theoros was sent by
his city as an official ambassador: this "civic"
theoros journeyed to an oracular centre or
festival, viewed the events and spectacles there,
and returned home with an official eyewitness
report.

[31]
Nightingale suggests that "wandering is translated into

wondering,"[32] but to subvert and reverse this may prove
equally interesting. Did wandering cause wondering, as
Nightingale supposes, or did wondering instead cause early
philosophers to wander outward, as Aristotle thought in
theMetaphysics from place to place in search of a response to
their apprehended worlds? What seems most clear is this:
Wonder is an original cause of philosophical theoria, and this
cognizing variety of inquiry has roots in sublime fascination as
equally as poetry does. Early philosophy, then, is a modality
which responds to the apprehended world. What I contend,
however, is that once language fuses with the wondering of
philosophers, theoria is the result; thereafter, wonder
terminates via a performative answering-style of languageuse.
3. The Difference Between Theoria and Gnosis
At this point I introduce a dyad which illustrates a distinction - linguistic, phenomenological, ontological -- between
philosophical theoria and what poetician Harold Bloom
identifies as poetic gnosis. The poet as "maker" -- this
etymology from the Greek poietes[33] -- falls out of language
in that moment when, like philosophers, the cognitive
dissonance of wonder, or non-comprehension, is first
apprehended. This, what I term a 'poeticognosis,' is the
interstice from where poets discover or invent their surprising
and delightful amalgam of linguistic truth effects. What I
emphasize here is that poetries differ from philosophies
because they are mediated by this variety of gnosis and not by
theoria. Figure i (below) indicates the foundation and split
between the genres.

Figure 1. The relation of phenomenology and language to speechact.

So what kind of response to wondering is gnosis, then, if it is
not the theoria that produces philosophical comprehension?
Taking his lead from the Gnostics of the early Christian and
Hebraic traditions, Bloom identifies gnosis in Agon: Towards a
Theory of Revisionism (1982) as "more-than-rational
knowledge."[34] Elsewhere, gnosis is framed more broadly as
a form of esoteric knowledge.[35] Bloom speculates further.
He defines the experience of reading poetry as a type of
gnosis that resonates on an existential level for readers, who

personalize the universal.
[I]n the deep reading of a poem what you come
to know is a concept of happening, a realization
of events in the history of your own spark or
pneuma, and your knowing is the most important
movement in that history … If this is what the
poet speaks to, then this is what must answer
that call by a knowing, a knowing that precisely
is not that which is known.[36]
By implication, what poets know, which is gnostic, is
transferred to readers in a process similar to Aristotelian
catharsis. The esoteric knowledge of the poet is a particular
sense of the world, something Wallace Stevens frames as the
"exterior made/ Interior," where the world is beautified in a
language "purposefully in flight from the obsessive universe of
human repetitions,"[37] as Bloom puts it, a text "broodingly
abreath/ With the inhalations of original cold/ And of original
earliness,"[38] as Stevens puts it. This is a contrasting mode
of "ontologizing," remarkably different from what Plato's text
attempts. It is as if Plato's universal forms, as originary
realities witnessed by the poet's mind, speak themselves into
poems. The gnostic moment of a poem being written may be
characterized by the angle taken (transcendental[39]) or
approach toward language (moving the particular into
universal resonances) or the experiential perspective ("the
poet makes") unifying the unknowable and the mysterious
with the textual. As a form of more-than-rational knowledge, I
contend that this taxonomy of knowing is particular to poets.
The apprehending mind of the poet, sensitive to an originary
wonder, becomes receptive and allows the unknown to present
itself as itself. In so doing, poets accept a context wherein the
mind acknowledges that which it cannot comprehend but
reaches out toward it nonetheless. Is this why T.S. Eliot,
noting the process of enacting poems as an "escape from
personality," suggests that the "progress of an artist is a
continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of
personality"?[40] Perhaps so, for in a Heideggerian moment of
at-homeness in the world, poets take measure of the radical
mysteriousness of their dwelling and existing, which is a
selfless projection of the Stevensonian "exterior made
interior." A poem is an answer to a sublime call, a song that
utters into strange context that which is human. In ways not
dissimilar to Plato's idea of the universal forms, then, a poem
can speak of the world wondrously as if it is filled with
timeless, beautiful objects.
Further, a poem contains the apprehended tremorings of an
imagination as it agitates, in a Kant-like way, without
assuaging the anxieties of not-knowing via theoria's
answering-style of performative comprehension. Poems
continue to wonder and ask of their readers to perceive the
humanly real in context with the actuality of their sublime
surroundings. It is this gnosis, I contend, that Stevens
articulates in "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven", §V, as
Reality as a thing seen by the mind
Not that which is but that which is apprehended,

A mirror, a lake of reflections in a room,
A glassy ocean lying at the door,
A great town hanging pendent in a shade,
An enormous nation happy in a style,
Everything as unreal as real can be,
In the inexquisite eye.[41]
The gnosis of poets is a different style of attaching thinking
and language, where the apprehending mind re-contextualizes
the humanly real to a point where all things, things-inthemselves, are renewed as if seen for the first time. This is
the inexhaustible wondering of poets as they wander the
darker psychic recesses or, to follow Plato's allegory, the far
reaches of the cave. The languages of poetries re-present
readers to themselves in an uncanny context. This is a notknowing, a re-contextualizing via a higher form of knowing. A
poem will open onto textual fields of reality that are so
unfamiliar they seem unreal to an audience. The task of the
poet is to re-view the sensate world in wonder and then open
the languages of their poems to the shock and surprise of
originary, newly seen meaning.
Endnotes
[1] Stevens, Wallace, "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven",
§XXII, lines 1-8, in Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of
Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 481.
Stevens, in a later section of this poem, refers to it as an
"endlessly elaborating poem" which "Displays the theory of
poetry/ As the life of poetry. A more severe,/ More harassing
master would extemporize/ Subtler, more urgent proof that
the theory/ Of poetry is the theory of life." See §XXVIII, lines
12-15, p. 486. I selectively (rather than exhaustively) re-read
"An Ordinary Evening in New Haven" throughout my discussion
because I believe it contains what can be considered an
exemplary and comprehensive theory of poetry.
[2] Plato, (The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London:
Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 98 (398a). See Sterling and Scott's
translation in Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W. Sterling
and William C. Scott (New York; London: WW Norton and
Company, 1985), p. 95.
[3] Performative utterances use language to self-enact,
whereas constative utterances can be judged to be either true
or false. See J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 3.
[4] Danto, Arthur C., The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of
Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 6.
[5] Edmundson, Mark, Literature Against Philosophy, Plato to
Derrida: A Defence of Poetry (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p. 1.
[6] Poets are accused by Plato of "(m)isrepresenting the
nature of gods and heroes, like a portrait painter whose
portraits bear no resemblance to their originals." See Plato,
The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London: Penguin Classics,

1974), p.73 (377e). Sterling and Scott's translation reads
"(w)henever they tell a tale that plays false with the true
nature of gods and heroes. Then they are like painters whose
portraits bear no resemblance to their models." See Plato, The
Republic, trans. Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott, (New
York; London: WW Norton and Company, 1985), p. 74.
[7] Plato writes "[A]ll the poets from Homer downwards have
no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of
any subject they treat, including human excellence." See Plato,
The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London: Penguin Classics,
1974), p. 367 (600e). See Sterling and Scott's translation in
Plato, The Republic, trans. by Richard W. Sterling and William
C. Scott (New York; London: WW Norton and Company,
1985), p. 291.
[8] "The gravest charge against poetry still remains. It has a
terrible power to corrupt even the best characters, with very
few exceptions." See Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond
Lees (London: Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 374 (605c). Sterling
and Scott's translation is located in Plato, The Republic, trans.
Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott (New York; London:
WW Norton and Company, 1985), p. 296.
[9] Stevens, Wallace, "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven",
§XII, lines 1-7, in Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of
Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 473.
[10] I devised this dyad after Kant. See "§26 On Estimating
the Magnitude of Natural Things, as We Must for the Idea of
the Sublime" in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans.
and introduction by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1987), p. 108.
[11] Mackey, Louis, An Ancient Quarrel Continued: The
Troubled Marriage of Philosophy and Literature (Lanham; New
York; Oxford: University Press, 2002), p. 11.
[12] Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London:
Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 260 (517b). Sterling and Scott's
translation differs only slightly: the tone and meaning alter
slightly accordingly. See Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W.
Sterling and William C. Scott (New York; London: WW Norton
and Company, 1985), pp. 211-212.
[13] Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W. Sterling and
William C. Scott (New York; London: WW Norton and
Company, 1985), p. 211 (517b).
[14] This is epitomised in Glaucon's avowal, which concludes
Book Ten of The Republic, that "your argument convinces me,
as I think it would anyone else." See Plato, The Republic,
trans. Desmond Lees (London: Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 377
(608b). Sterling and Scott translate this simply as "You are
right. I agree." See Plato, The Republic, trans. Richard W.
Sterling and William C. Scott (New York; London: WW Norton
and Company, 1985), p. 298.
[15] Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London:
Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 363 (597e). Sterling and Scott's
translation ("… one who makes something at third remove
from nature you call an imitator") is found on page 288 of
their translation.

[16] Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London:
Penguin Classics, 1974), p. 98 (398a). See Sterling and Scott's
translation, p. 95.
[17] That, as Horace states, delight as they instruct.
[18] Stevens, Wallace, "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven",
§XXII, lines 1-8, in Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of
Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p. 481.
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and T.V.F. Brogan, eds., The New Princeton Encyclopedia of
Poetry and Poetics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
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[21] Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lees (London:
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Richard W. Sterling and William C. Scott (New York; London:
WW Norton and Company, 1985), p. 212 (518d).
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beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and
possessed." See Plato, Ion, trans. Hayden Pelliccia (New York:
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(982b13-18).
[29] Nightingale, Andrea Wilson, Spectacles of Truth in
Classical Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), p. 12.
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